Introduction
The Naval Research Laboratory has a number of accelerators capable of producing neutrons with their attendant neutron radiation safety problems. These include a 66 MeV Linac, a 55 MeV Cyclotron, a 5 MeV Van de Graaff and a Kaman Neutron generator. Since the radiation safety problems which occur at a neutron generator are common to all these machines we will discuss all of them as a class of machines called neutron producing accelerators. These machines at NRL produce neutron fluxes up to 1014 neutrons per second (Linac) with energies up to 40 MeV (Cyclotron). Neutron producing accelerators present special radiation safety problems which can roughly be divided into two categories: Measurement and control of the neutron field and measurement and control of the activation products left after the machine is turned off. This paper will outline some of the problems that we have encountered and some of the steps that we have taken to "solve" these problems at NRL. In Fig. 2 a similar set of curves is drawn for the published response of the Eberline PNC-4 neutron survey meter which is the instrument generally used at NRL. The PNC-4 uses a typical BF3 detector which can be inserted in a moderator to detect high enery neutrons or can be used out of the moderator for lower energy ones. These energy response curves for the probe in or out of the moderator are taken from the Eberline instruction manual. From the figure it is apparent that the instrument will under-respond to the higher energy neutrons encountered at an accelerator. Furthermore, no information is given at all in the critical region around 10 KeV where the Quality Factor Curve starts to rise rapidly. Because of such problems neutron radiation fields at NRL are dealt with very conservatively. EuEmsT RES ONSE OF EIERLINI PNC-4
Neutron Measurements
Neutron Shielding
As an illustration of the difficulties that may be encountered in desiging shielding at a neutron facility Fig. 3 were produced for this program by directing a 10 pA, 35 MeV beam of deuterons onto a thick Be target. The beam was collimated with a conical Benelex and steel shield. The original design of this maze which did not include the paraffin baffle walls or door shown in the figure was arrived at after a long series of calculations and measurements were made on a similar beam in another room.
Unfortunately in making our measurements we considered only the scatter from the primary beam since it seemed obvious to us that that would be the controlling factor. We were wrong. After the maze was built we measured the leakage radiation field in the hallway and found, much to our embarrassment, neutron radiation levels exceeding 300 mRem/hr at the point marked A on the figure. Subsequent investigation showed that the most probable source of the neutrons was along the leakage path indicated by the dotted line. Surprisingly multiple scatter from the primary beam contributed very little to the neutron flux in the hall as was proven by plugging the beam port in the shield. As a result of our miscalculations a 30 cm boron loaded, paraffin door had to be installed at the entrance to the maze in the position shown. This reduced the neutron dose rate to less than 4 mRem/hr at position A which, coupled with the small percentage of the time that the beam would be on, was considered adequate.
Neutron Activation Table 1 lists some of the activation products that we have found at our accelerators. The isotopes at the top of the table are those most frequently found usually as contaminants. Two of the most troubling are 7Be and 54Mn. The difficulty with these isotopes arises because they decay through the process of electron capture. Since they don't emit an electron or positron when they decay, normal counting techniques are not very efficient at detecting them on smear surveys. For instance our counters, which include gas flow proportional counters and pancake geiger tubes are about 50% efficient at detecting normal isotopes. For 7Be and 54Mn, however, they are less than 4% efficient. As a result all the smears must be analyzed on a GeLi detector to determine if any 7Be or 54Mn contamination is present.
At the bottom of Table 1 is a listing of some of the other isotopes which we have found. This list is presented merely as an indication of the wide variety of contaminants or activation products which can be expected at accelerators where (n,xn) processes can occur. Table 2 along with their rate of production, activity, and y ray production after a 5 min. irradiation (At78). Sumary From our experience with the radiation safety problems created at NRL by accelerator neutrons, we have drawn certain general conclusions. The first is that neutron dosimetry is not a stra ightforward process. In general given "the state of the art" the neutron dose is not easily determined and any neutron measurement should be treated with a great deal of skepticism. At NRL we take a very conservative approach to neutron doses, usually requiring that neutron dose rates be a factor of five below allowable limits.
The activation problem at a neutron-producing accelerator is also significant. In order to keep personnel doses as low as possible it is necessary to maintain strict control over target materials and entry into a target area. Finally the design of shielding at a neutron facility must be given careful consideration by as many people as can be assembled who are familiar with the strange quirrks of scattering neutrons.
